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Abstract - The study of cooperation shows that often it 
brings gains to the agents. In this study it is shown that 
cooperation is very interesting when exploiting marine 
live resources. Several kinds of models have been used 
to show the advantages of cooperation in fisheries (see 
Munro, 2002; Miller and Munro, 2002; Clark, 1980; or 
Levhari and Mirman, 1980, for example). In this study, 
a general model for fisheries is presented and a 
Cournot-Nash model supported on the variable fishing 
effort is introduced, both showing that cooperation is 
useful. 




The study of commons is very important when 
intending to analyze the consequences of human 
behavior in the exploitation of Earth resources. 
Hardin’s publication of “the tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin, 1968) was a reference for the 
problems that traditionally occur in the natural 
resources area. The essence of the problem is that 
resources are over-exploited because each agent aims 
to have the maximum benefits in line with the 
generalized selfish human behavior. 
Hardin proposed several measures intending to 
preserve resources from over-exploitation. He 
proposed, for example, the privatization of resources 
or the implementation of coercive measures. Of 
course it is important to implement several rules to 
avoid tragedies and the cooperation among agents is 
an important instrument to reach this aim. This means 
that if there is cooperation – among all the agents 
who exploit the resource and the agents who rule or 
coordinate resources exploitation - the given resource 
is prone to be well managed, to be well regulated and 
to be well preserved. This may allow higher prices in 
the market for a given resource and higher levels of 
rents for fishers through low catches -or a reduced 
exploitation of the resource, whichever it is.  
This paper intends to discuss the advantages of 
cooperation and how cooperation and regulation may 
contribute to have high levels of stocks and to have 
high rents for fishers. After giving an overview, 
showing why cooperation seems to be important to 
bring up good results to fishing common pools, a 
presentation of the bio-economic modeling, as it has 
been presented traditionally, is outlined. Then, a 
Cournot-Nash model is presented to explain the 
competing agents’ behavior and the role of 
cooperation in fisheries. It is possible to see that 
cooperation brings up procedures that allow the 
preservation of species and stocks recover. Finally, 
some concluding remarks are over lighted from the 
study. 
2. The cooperation as an interesting 
way to manage resources 
In order to find out solutions to the problem of 
resource management, cooperation has been seen as 
an interesting way to reach good results in the 
exploitation of the commons. Some interesting 
patterns of human cooperation are exemplified in the 
literature on institutions for managing the commons 
(Richerson, Boyd and Paccioti, 2002).  Several 
authors have been studying cooperation on fishing 
area, as well. It is the case of Gronbaek (2000), who 
studies a cooperative and a non-cooperative solution 
in the fishing field and formalizes mathematically a 
sustainable cooperative solution. Munro (2002) 
presents, himself, some interesting cases of 
cooperation on fishing area.  Miller and Munro 
(2002) show that, in general, cooperation is important 
and that non-cooperation in fisheries usually leads to 
the overexploitation of the resources.  
Clark (1980) and Levhari and Mirman (1980) 
have studied non-cooperative fishing games. Their 
studies are supported in different hypotheses and 
methodologies but they reach similar conclusions. 
They show that if each country tries to maximize its 
own welfare, taking into account the actions of the 
other country, a long term equilibrium can be 
achieved. This equilibrium will guarantee the 
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maximization of the present value of the net 
economic revenue from the fishery over time and will 
keep the renewable resource stock at the optimal 
steady state biomass. Both papers show that the 
common bionomic equilibrium will occur at a lower 
stock than the one that would be optimal if the two 
countries form a cooperative venture (see Hang, 
2003). 
 Clark (1980) uses a linear control model to 
describe fisheries confined to the EEZ - European 
Economic Zone - waters of a single coastal state and 
then he assumes that there are two players in the 
game, sharing the fisheries of a single fish stock. 
Both trying to exploit the maximum possible part of 
the stock because they have no restrictions to access 
it. Consequently, the exploitation by each one of the 
agents will affect the available part of the stock that 
will remain in the sea and this will affect the amount 
of fish that its competitor will have available. Clark 
shows that non-cooperative feedback equilibrium is 
discontinuous in the control variable -fishing effort- 
and that only the most efficient country harvests in 
the equilibrium (see Hang, 2003). 
Levhari and Mirman (1980) use a Cournot model 
to compare the competitive and the collusion 
solutions to identify the advantages of cooperation in 
resources exploitation. They show that the Cournot-
Nash equilibrium leads to greater consumption as a 
function of the size of the fish population and to a 
smaller steady state consumption (see Hang, 2003). It 
is interesting to evidence that this methodological 
approach, which is not much used as the dynamic 
games proposal of Clark and followers, is 
rehabilitated in this paper. The reasons will be 
presented in this paper. 
The conservation of natural resources is an 
important issue that is relevant to study. Besides, 
when some agents propose themselves not to exploit 
a resource because they are worried with resources 
preservation, if one agent considers that there is an 
opportunity to gain advantages to exploit the 
resources that another agent has left and he does it, 
the tragedy may come. The agent that is concerned 
about the future has lost the rents for not exploiting 
the resource and, as a consequence, the other agent 
has won the short run rents for exploiting it. 
This problem represents very well the traditional 
formal issue “Dilemma of the Prisoner” that is 
relevant in the Game Theory analysis (Filipe, 2007; 
Filipe, Coelho & Ferreira, 2005). This problem is 
posed in the Game Theory for situations in which the 
two players in the game have dominant strategies, 
what makes that the solution of the game is a 
dominant strategies’ equilibrium. This equilibrium is 
stable and the players will not change their choices. 
What is a problem is that this kind of solution implies 
a total payoff that is under the result one that the 
players could have if they had some form of 
cooperation between them. In these situations, the 
players will choose the dominant strategy (which in 
the case of the natural resources is always the 
strategy of non conservation) and they will not have 
incentives to use efficiently and conserve the 
resource. The players are compelled to switch this 
strategy because they are functioning in competition 
conditions. So, this puts the players in a situation that 
represents a dilemma with ethical boundaries. By one 
side, the fisherman really thinks that is important to 
have a proper management policy for the use of the 
resource in the long term but by the other side he is 
compelled to have an egoistic and myopic view of the 
resource use and exploit it too much compared with 
the ideal inter-temporal production level. 
The problem of over-fishing has long been 
claiming for good practices coming from 
international cooperation and coming from a 
preserving approach on the processes of decision 
making of resource management institutions. This 
may be some kind of a contribution to solve some of 
the multiple problems in the area of Commons. So, to 
solve the problem of maintaining the biodiversity, the 
preservation and related ethical issues in this area it is 
necessary to pose questions about how to use 
environment and Earth resources and how to treat 
other species, plant or animal. Cooperation has an 
important role in this subject. 
3. The advantages of cooperation in a 
general model for fisheries  
The purpose is to study the advantages of 
cooperation behavior. The presentation of this section 
allows to get a theoretical view for the bio-economic 
analysis of fishing agents.  
In order to see how an optimal control problem 
may be important to analyze such a situation, as 
shortly as possible this problem in described this 
section. 
First, assume asymmetric competitors with 
different fishing costs and that there is no 
cooperation. 
The resource dynamics is given by the following 
differential equation (see, for example, Arnason 
(1990), Conrad and Clark (1987), Munro (1979)): 
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The variable x )0( x  is the state variable 
that denotes the biomass - fishery resource measured 
in terms of weight - 
 RXtx )( . X is the state 
space. ))(( txF  is the stock growth function. 
))(( txF  is assumed to be a continuous function, 
concave in x , and so 0)()0(  KFF  for some 
0K  and for 0))(( txF ,  Ktx ,0)(  . The 
stock representing K  is the carrying capacity of the 
resource. 
Also: 
)()()( txtEqth iii     
(2). 
This equation represents the standard Schaefer 
harvest function. In the equation, iq  represents the 
“catch ability coefficient” of player i  and iE  its 
fishing effort. This equation shows the relationship 
between fishing effort and catches of player i . If it is 
assumed that 1q , so: 
EcxpEx iii )(),(     
(3). 
Each player sells his own fished resource at a 
constant price ip  and supports the costs in direct 
proportion to his fishing effort and it is possible that 
)())(( tEctEC iii  . C  represents the global cost 
and ic  is the unit cost of fishing effort to the player 
i . So, player i will attempt to maximize the present 
value of the net economic revenue from the fishery 






















      
 
(4). 
The variable E is defined according 
max)(0 ii EtE  and 0  is the player i 
discount rate. Both players may face different costs, 
prices and fishing technologies. 
This optimal control (linear) problem, with x(t) 
as the state variable and E(t) as the control variable, 
allows to conclude that there exists an unique optimal 
solution and an optimal steady state biomass 
*x . 











    (5) 
This equation works as a resource investment 
rule. It states, in effect, that an agent should invest in 
the resource up to the point that the yield on the 
marginal investment in the resource (RHS of the 
equation) is equal to the social rate of discount.  
Besides, if the vessel capital employed in 
harvesting the resource is perfectly malleable, the 
optimal approach path to 
*x  is the most rapid one. In 
fact, in terms of the variable h(t),  the following 
solution holds: 
)()( ** xFth  , if *xx  ; 
max* )( hth  , if 
*xx    
and 0)(* th , if 
*xx   
  (6) 
If the capital employed is not perfectly 
malleable, or if the appropriate optimal control model 
is non-linear (e.g. because the demand for fish 
exhibits finite elasticity), the most rapid approach 
path is no longer optimal (see Miller and Munro, 
2002). 
Equation (5) gives the optimal solution when 
there is a problem for just one single state. If there are 
two players (states), both competing for the same 
fishing stock, the solution (Clark, 1980) will be 
determined by: 
 
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This means that when the players act 
independently, the Nash non-cooperative feed-back 
solution is such that the resource will be depleted in a 
most rapid approach manner until the bionomic level 

2x has been reached. That is, in the two players’ 
game, the shared stock resource can be subject to 
overexploitation if an agreement cannot be achieved 
between the two players. 
The cooperation appears as a way to overcome 
the consequences of negative externalities arising 
from the exploitation of the resource. In Filipe 
(2006), it is shown that in some situations 
cooperation is not necessary or indispensable. 
However, in general, the non-cooperative agents’ 
behavior of leads to sub-optimal solutions and, from 
the society point of view, a better solution would be 
reached through a cooperative behavior. 
4. Cournot-Nash model for fisheries 
Besides the optimal control problem we have 
seen, we may have an interesting model based on the 
Cournot oligopoly model that allows us to conclude 
that cooperation brings very interesting results when 
we intend to preserve species and that cooperation 
improve rents for fishers. In fact, the Cournot-Nash 
model we implemented is a simple model and it has 
the big advantage of being easily understood by the 
stakeholders of fishing sector. This model shows the 
disadvantages of non-cooperation. An extension of 
the model shows, as well, that cooperation between 
agents allows better results by improving their 
situation and the levels of fish stocks.  
Considering the Cournot model and integrating 
Nash equilibrium concept, usually used in theory of 
games and considering yet fishing effort, it is 
possible to study the issue of efficiency and 
overcapitalization  in fisheries in a Nation’s waters 
(see Filipe, 2006).  
Captures of this species are the quantities (q) 
used in the traditional Cournot Model. In the usual 
fishing theories, this variable, quantities, has a formal 
relationship with fishing effort. In this model, this 
variable (quantities) is replaced by another variable, 
related to that one, precisely the fishing effort (E). 
So, the usual equations 
 
πi (q1; q2) = RTi - CTi, i=1,2                            (9) 
 
are replaced in the model by the equations  
 
πi (E1; E2) = RTi - CTi, i=1,2; qi = f(Ei;X); (10) 
 
Ei is the fishing effort used by FPi (FP are the 
Fishing Producers) and X is the biomass level for the 
specie. 
The Cournot model and the consequent Cournot-
Nash equilibrium allow to analyze the contribution of 
cooperation for the preservation of stocks and to 
analyze its contribution for the stabilization of 
fishers’ rents (Filipe, 2006). 
With the maximization of aggregate fishing 
effort it is expected to reach a lower level than the 
sum of the reached levels for each individual 
solution. This is consistent with benefits expected for 
fishing producers, because fishing costs are expected 
to be lower. As an additional result, it is expected that 
the market price would be higher and the aggregate 
rent would be higher, as well. Besides, as the 
aggregate fishing effort is expected to be lower, it is 
expectable that fishers will control catches as well, 
and consequently, also to get a stock's management 
more compatible with conservative objectives. These 
conclusions are the expected results from the usual 
analysis of Cournot and cartel models (Filipe, 2006). 
These conclusions permit to confirm evidences 
that cooperation is an important factor for the 
preservation of this specie and it is important to keep 
high fisher’s rents levels. Besides the political 
reasons, fishers may promote some measures to 
reduce catches and to organize markets, preserving 
species for the future generations and protecting 
fishing present interests. Fishers may manage catches 
in order to control the activity of fleets and in order to 
control fishing effort. Consequently, levels for 
catches may decrease and species’ stocks may be 
well managed. Stocks may be improved and fishers’ 
rents may benefit with this kind of management. In 
addition, costs may decrease because producers may 
adjust their production capacity to the required 
supplies to match the demand of fishing product in 
the market.  
These behaviors represent a genuine form of 
cooperation. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The analysis for fisheries permits the 
opportunity of studying the role of regulation and 
cooperation on stocks recovery. 
The main conclusions of the paper are the 
following: 
First, cooperation contributes to regulate 
catches. It seems a good way to support high prices 
and high rents for fishers and to contribute to 
preserve stocks. The study confirms these evidences 
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and shows that, even for higher catches, higher levels 
for stocks could be supported, as well. 
This analysis shows that cooperation can be well 
understood by the stakeholders of the fishing sector 
and it proves that there are great benefits, through just 
a simple way of managing fisheries.  
Second, the Cournot-Nash model used to 
analyze this situation has evident advantages. This 
model contributes for a better understanding of 
fishing problems. It seems that this study is very 
useful for authorities to plan and to rule fishing and 
for a good communication between national and local 
institutions of the fishing sector. This general model 
is easily understood by the stakeholders of the fishing 
sector. 
It is a very simple model that can be well 
applied by the public decision-makers and it seems to 
be well adapted to fishing realities. The model is very 
flexible, adjustable and appropriate to analyze any 
species since one can adjust it to the available data 
for the specie object of study. It is very relevant for 
situations in which it is necessary urgent adjustments 
for consumption or production.  
The flexibility of the model allows us to shape it 
according to the available information. However, it is 
necessary to have a minimum of information for 
variables such as stocks, fishing effort, catches or 
costs. Besides, this study does not include the 
analysis of any problems emerged from offers made 
by foreign fleets. 
This model gives to the cooperation a central 
place in the context of management of a living 
resource, either in exploitation field or in the market 
for the resource studied.  
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